Emozioni, giudizi e valori

This paper represents only the initial stage of my research and its main goal is to go over some aspects of the current debate on emotions. After laying out the cognitivist position, I will review some objections that have been moved to it. After that I will focus on the work on emotions recently done by de Sousa, Mulligan and Wollheim. In the literature, views on emotions have played a role in the debate on the nature of values. So at the end of the paper I will very briefly tackle the issue of values in relation to the so-called "response-dependence" approach

Thinking Fast and Slow in AI: the Role of Metacognition

Multiple Authors - please see paper attached. AI systems have seen dramatic advancement in recent years, bringing many applications that pervade our everyday life. However, we are still mostly seeing instances of narrow AI: many of these recent developments are typically focused on a very limited set of competencies and goals, e.g., image interpretation, natural language processing, classification, prediction, and many others. We argue that a better study of the mechanisms that allow humans to have these capabilities can help us understand how to imbue AI systems with these competencies. We focus especially on D. Kahneman’s theory of thinking fast and slow , and we propose a multi-agent AI architecture (called SOFAI, for SlOw and Fast AI) where incoming problems are solved by either system 1 (or "fast") agents (also called "solvers"), that react by exploiting only past experience, or by system 2 (or "slow") agents, that are deliberately activated when there is the need to reason and search for optimal solutions beyond what is expected from the system 1 agent

Reasoning, Belief and the Quest for Truth

In this dissertation, I offer a new explanation for the fact that we can’t, as a result of reasoning, come to believe something simply because we want to, i.e. the fact that we can’t believe at will. On my view, reasoning is the inferential process necessarily guided by the aim of arriving at a conclusion (e.g. forming a belief) sufficiently supported by normative reasons. I also defend the view that believing a proposition is tantamount to being disposed to use it as a default premise in reasoning. These two claims combined show that the impossibility of believing at will is the result of our capacity to reason. The limited power we have over our beliefs is thus a condition of possibility for being the type of reasoners we are

Absurd Stories, Ideologies, and Motivated Cognition

PENULTIMATE DRAFT. At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as a seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect beliefs

The State of AI Ethics Report (June 2020)

These past few months have been especially challenging, and the deployment of technology in ways hitherto untested at an unrivalled pace has left the internet and technology watchers aghast. Artificial intelligence has become the byword for technological progress and is being used in everything from helping us combat the COVID-19 pandemic to nudging our attention in different directions as we all spend increasingly larger amounts of time online. It has never been more important that we keep a sharp eye out on the development of this field and how it is shaping our society and interactions with each other. With this inaugural edition of the State of AI Ethics we hope to bring forward the most important developments that caught our attention at the Montreal AI Ethics Institute this past quarter. Our goal is to help you navigate this ever-evolving field swiftly and allow you and your organization to make informed decisions. This pulse-check for the state of discourse, research, and development is geared towards researchers and practitioners alike who are making decisions on behalf of their organizations in considering the societal impacts of AI-enabled solutions. We cover a wide set of areas in this report spanning Agency and Responsibility, Security and Risk, Disinformation, Jobs and Labor, the Future of AI Ethics, and more. Our staff has worked tirelessly over the past quarter surfacing signal from the noise so that you are equipped with the right tools and knowledge to confidently tread this complex yet consequential domain

Combining Fast and Slow Thinking for Human-like and Efficient Navigation in Constrained Environments

[Multiple authors] In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision quality, resource consumption, and efficiency

E-PDDL: A Standardized Way of Defining Epistemic Planning Problems

Epistemic Planning (EP) refers to an automated planning setting where the agent reasons in the space of knowledge states and tries to find a plan to reach a desirable state from the current state. Its general form, the Multi-agent Epistemic Planning (MEP) problem involves multiple agents who need to reason about both the state of the world and the information flow between agents. In a MEP problem, multiple approaches have been developed recently with varying restrictions, such as considering only the concept of knowledge while not allowing the idea of belief, or not allowing for ``complex" modal operators such as those needed to handle dynamic common knowledge. While the diversity of approaches has led to a deeper understanding of the problem space, the lack of a standardized way to specify MEP problems independently of solution approaches has created difficulties in comparing performance of planners, identifying promising techniques, exploring new strategies like ensemble methods, and making it easy for new researchers to contribute to this research area. To address the situation, we propose a unified way of specifying EP problems - the Epistemic Planning Domain Definition Language, E-PDDL. We show that E-PPDL can be supported by leading MEP planners and provide corresponding parser code that translates EP problems specified in E-PDDL into (M)EP problems that can be handled by several planners. This work is also useful in building more general epistemic planning environments where we envision a meta-cognitive module that takes a planning problem in E-PDDL, identifies and assesses some of its features, and autonomously decides which planner is the best one to solve it

Thinking Fast and Slow in AI: the Role of Metacognition

AI systems have seen dramatic advancement in recent years, bringing many applications that pervade our everyday life. However, we are still mostly seeing instances of narrow AI: many of these recent developments are typically focused on a very limited set of competencies and goals, e.g., image interpretation, natural language processing, classification, prediction, and many others. Moreover, while these successes can be accredited to improved algorithms and techniques, they are also tightly linked to the availability of huge datasets and computational power. State-of-the-art AI still lacks many capabilities that would naturally be included in a notion of (human) intelligence. We argue that a better study of the mechanisms that allow humans to have these capabilities can help us understand how to imbue AI systems with these competencies. We focus especially on D. Kahneman's theory of thinking fast and slow, and we propose a multi-agent AI architecture where incoming problems are solved by either system 1 (or "fast") agents, that react by exploiting only past experience, or by system 2 (or "slow") agents, that are deliberately activated when there is the need to reason and search for optimal solutions beyond what is expected from the system 1 agent. Both kinds of agents are supported by a model of the world, containing domain knowledge about the environment, and a model of "self", containing information about past actions of the system and solvers' skills